Gen. Tran Van Minh Remembers the Fall of Saigon
Gen. Tran Van Minh Remembers the Fall of Saigon
My Truth
Tran Van Minh, Commander of the South Vietnamese Air Force
I can only tell you my truth. It is not the truth for any other Vietnamese general or military officer. It is not the truth for any Vietnamese politician. It is not the truth for my family or for my friends. And above all else, it is not God's truth. In time we will know God's truth. In time. But all I am sure of right now is my truth -- what I saw and what I believed. This is my truth.
The answer to the tragedy of the defeat of South Vietnam is simple. It can be summed up by two words: "not enough." We did not have enough supplies in the last weeks of the war. And we did not have enough soldiers. That was all. That was the whole problem. Not enough.
The American media said that we lost the war because we were corrupt. I cannot deny that there was corruption in Vietnam. There was. There was corruption in business and in politics and even in some parts of the military. But there was no corruption in the Air Force. My men believed in their country and they had faith in their officers. There was no corruption that I saw among the officers of the men.
Our problem was that we did not have enough parts and we did not have enough fuel.
We were especially low on fuel at the end of the war. So we could not fly our airplanes. Our forces were grounded. The american, though, had computers and long lists of figures. They told us that we had enough. They decided that we had enough fuel and spare parts. They decided that on a political basis. They did not decide that on a realistic basis.
All we ever needed was supplies. Supplies to fight with. When the supplies were no longer given to us, that hurt the morale of the officers and the troops. Everybody saw the end of the supplies. They knew we would run out. And when they saw that happening they knew that we had been abandoned by our best friends. And then they lost much of their will to fight.
I never dreamed that our friends would betray us and drop us. I thought of Berlin and Korea as the examples of American resolve. And I saw how the Americans protected them. I thought that we, too, were one of the outposts of freedom in the world.
Ambassador Graham Martin told me again and again that the Americans would never abandon us. He said we could count on that for sure.
What happened in the end is just what some Americans say happened. We lost the war faster than the North could win it. That is true. I supposed that President Thieu's policy of abandoning the highlands after the fall of Banmethuot was a good one. But if we had been supplied properly, then our morale would have been maintained and we could have reorganized and redeployed and fought on.
When President Thieu resigned on April 21st, I thought that was a hopeful sign. I thought that perhaps now there would be a new agreement, a new partition. Vice President Huong became president. He was an old and revered teacher. He was an honest man. But then he turned the presidency over to General Duong Van Minh.
Some of us thought that maybe Minh could make a peace agreement. But we also thought that everything that was happening was just a shadow. We believed that in Vietnam we were no longer deciding anything. Everything, we believed, was being determined behind the scenes by the superpowers. The Americans and the Russians and the Chinese, we believed, had decided the fate of Vietnam. We were waiting day by day to see what they had decided somewhere in secret. We thought part of their agreement must have been for America to stop sending us supplies.
In the last days of the Republic of Vietnam I spoke with General Nguyen Cao Ky many times. And many times he asked me to lead a coup. He said, "Be very careful. The Americans are protecting President Thieu. Don't let them know your plans." Then I would see him a few days later and he would ask me, "When are you going to lead a coup? When is the coup?" I told him that I did not want to lead a coup. I asked him if he had a plan for a coup. And he said, no, he did not. He said he thought that I did.
He was so cautious. He wanted me to lead a coup so that he could become the new leader of the country. But what General Ky did not understand was that my officers and my men and I were not loyal to any one man. We were loyal to our country. We were loyal to Vietnam. We all loved Vietnam. So many of my men died for Vietnam.
They fought and died not for any man, but for Vietnam.
In his autobiography General Ky said that I came to his house and said that I was loyal to him whatever he did. He said that I told him that people from the American Embassy were trying to bribe me to work for them and to spy on him. None of that was true. No one ever tried to bribe me--especially no one from the American Embassy. And I never had that conversation with General Ky. It is almost funny reading it. Why did he put that in his book, anyway? Where did he get that? Maybe he was writing about someone else. He could not have been writing about me.
On April 29th, late in the morning, I got a call from the DAO saying that there was to be a meeting of the Americans and the commanding officers of the Vietnamese Air Force. I went to the DAO with several of my men. We were shown into a room. Then we were left alone for a long time. We thought Ambassador Martin or General Homer Smith(The Defense Attache) or someone else would come in with a new plan for striking back at the North Vietnamese. But they never showed up. No one showed up until the late afternoon. After we had gone into the compound they had a guard disarm us. That had never happened before.
Then finally someone came into the room, an officer, and said, "This is the end, General Minh. A helicopter is outside waiting to take you away." We went outside to the helicopter. We were flown out to the Blue Ridge in the South China Sea.
An American Air Force colonel was on the helicopter with us. He sat next to me. He was crying on the way out. He could not even talk. But he wrote something on a slip of paper and he handed it to me. It read, "General, I am so sorry." I still have that piece of paper. I will keep it all my life. I will always remember that sad flight out to the Blue Ridge.
We Vietnamese who are Buddhists, we believe that God disposes of all things. We believe that in this life we suffer many things because in a former life we did something wrong. I believe that in some former life that I cannot remember I must have done something very wrong. That is why all of this happened to me and to my country. Sometimes we may be able to modify fate if we live right and do what our hearts tell us to do. That is what I have always tried to do. I have always tried to do what is right and to do what my heart tells me to do.
But since the fall of my country my heart has been broken. For 20 years I have felt a great emptiness and a great sadness inside me. It will never go away. Every day I feel it. Not a day passes in my life that I do not think of Vietnam.
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2 C O M M E N T S :
Clare
Could you please tell me where this came from? I just want to make sure it is
true. Thanks!
FEBRUARY 15, 2013 AT 5:09 AM
lde
I interviewed Gen. Minh at his home in San Jose. His daughter Jade was present at the interview. That interview was first published in the Washington Post and then in the San Jose Mercury News in April 1985.
FEBRUARY 21, 2013 AT 9:21 PM
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